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INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps no other area of Islamic economic thought has been more misunderstood 
than that concerning the role of the rate of interest. Any economic system concerned 
primarily with the welfare of the individual must not only encourage allocative effi-
ciency, but~also promote economic growth if it is to avoid social injustice, economic 
stagnation and widespread unemployment. 1 The method of state allocation utilized 
in the eastern block countries is one' possible way of avoiding the widespread use of 
interest rates. Given that complete or near complete socialization of the means of 
production that this system requires is contrary to the individualistic moralistic 
philosophy of Islam, the Saudi government is, given its concern for the welfare of 
the economy, left with little choice but to somehow direct savings through the 
organized capital markets to the private sector. 
The difficult problem from, an Islamic point of view arises because the only 
known method of encouraging the productive use of saving is to raise the interest 
rate to the point where the discounted marginal social cost of investment is equal to 
the discounted marginal social benefit of investment. 
If the interest rate is not permitted to rise to some positive value to discourage 
marginal and inefficient projects, it is likely the kingdom's objectives of social 
justice with material betterment for its citizens will not be met. 
•Associate Professor Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California, U.S.A. 
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The simple fact is that the interpretation of Islamic doctrine to abolish the interest 
rate is not only not as straightforward as it is supposed to be, but quite naive, given 
the fact that alternative policies may generate .greater social inequalities than the ex-
istence of interest is alleged to promote--the inequality of income between labor and 
capital. While accepting the fact that positive interest rates help in achieving 
economic efficiency and economic growth, Islamic sholars often contend that its use 
can still not be justified on moral grounds. 2 
If we accept the fact that given our present state of knowledge, other policy 
alternatives create economic inefficiency and inhibit economic growth, then it is in-
cumbent that Islamic countries create some sort of institutional arrangement 
whereby the positive aspects of the interest rate are allowed to function while 
simultaneously its negative or morally objectionable features are suppressed. The 
sections that follow attempt to assess the success to which the Saudi authorities have 
had in structuring an efficient financial system along Islamic lines. 
At present the Saudi Arabian financial system comprises five major institutions 
1. the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 
2. the money changers, 
3. the commercial banks, 
4. public spe<(jalist institutions, and 
5. the Islamic banks. 
In the discussion that follows, particular attention is given to the latter three in-
stitutions, especially with regard to those factors which impinge on the government's 
ability to stabilize the economy while meeting the major objectives of the country's 
development plans. 
Development of Commercial Banks 
· Commercial banking in Saudi Arabia grew up largely through the provision of 
import finance. This type of activity still predominates, although there is a trend 
toward diversification of bank assets. Deposits are still largely short term, however, 
and as a result many banks are still reluctant to undertake a very large number of 
long term commitments. Bid bonds and contract guarantees have become another 
lucrative area, although bonds for the big contracts must be syndicated abroad 
(since the Saudi banks do not have a large enough capital base to undertake them). 
Despite these changes commercial bankilig has not expanded as dramatically as 











Because of restrictions on interest rates, banks have not been able to attract as 
many funds as would normally be the case. 
The banking system itself is largely oligopolistic (only two Saudi banks) with 
little competition to force expanded service and coverage. 
SAMA has been extremely conservative in issuing new licenses (only one was 
issued during the last decade). 
Stiff competition still exists from the money changers who perform many of the 
services provided for by the banks. 
Foreign or suitcase banking has become an important element in the system. 
State owned credit banks are major lenders in certain areas. 
SAMA has not allowed offshore banks to open, but instead has preferred to see 
offshore Saudi financing develop in Bahrain with Saudi bank's opening sub-
sidiaries there. 
Qualified labor is quite scarce with many Saudi families discouraging a career in 
banking for religious reasons. 
Several characteristics set the Saudi Arabian banking system apart from its 
counterpart in Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE. These include: 
1 . the absence of interest rate regulations, 
2. the lack of a domestic capital market,. 
3. the slow "progress towards any investment banking activity-relying, that is, on 
management skills rather than balance sheet optimization. 
Lending Activities 
While perhaps not expanding as fast as one might have anticipated due to the 
overall rate of growth of the economy, the sheer size of the expansion of assets in 
recent years clearly indicates the dynamic conditions prevailing in the country's 
financial markets. Private sector loans and investments have increased by almost 
twenty times during the 1965-79 period3 
Domestic loans and investments comprised over 40 percent of the banks' assets in 
1979. This figure has been relatively constant with fluctuations around 5 percent of 
this figure through the 1970s. Bank assets are, despite the Islamic preference for 
direct equity investment, mainly comprised of loans. In fact, Saudi commercial 
banks like their western counterparts have a strong preference for revolving credit 
loans rather than longer term commitments . 
• 
A breakdown of the lending by fhe commercial banks shows that, as in most 
developing countries, trade credit is of greatest importance. This activity accounted 
51 
for one-third of total bank loans in 1978. In large part these loans are used to 
finance local merchant's stocks of imported goods (as they often have to meet the 
payment to the foreign supplier before the goods are actually sold). Banks can, of 
course, provide letters of credit and guarantees for imports, but these are usually for 
only short periods. Saudi imports often require longer periods to turn their stock 
over. While importers have a number of financial options, it is apparent that the 
commercial banks are now playing a growth role in this area. Between 1977 and 
1978, for example, the value of trade credit increased by over one-third. 
The second most important area of bank credit is construction finance, compris-
ing over one-fifth of the banks' total loans in 1978. Commercial bank lending for 
construction takes place in spite of the activity of the state run Real Estate 
Development Fund, which provides interest free loans to private home buyers. In 
addition another agency, the Credit Fund for Contractors, gives highly subsidized 
short and medium term loans to Saudi building firms. There are a number of areas 
not covered by the public agencies, however, thus providing banks with a number of 
profitable lending areas. Housing and other facilities for immigrant workers, for 
example, are not covered by these funds, and in recent years there has been a boom 
in apartment building for these workers. In addition, bank lending for the con-
struction of commercial buildings and other urban nonresidential development has 
filled an area also not covered with public lending. 
Finally, in spite of the very generous financial provisions made for manufacturing 
ventures available by the Saudi Industrial Development Fund, commercial bank 
lending to industry has been expanding rapidly in both absolute and relative terms. 
In large part this expansion is a response to several gaps in the government's in-
dustrial financing program. The State Industrial Development Fund, for example, 
provides up to 50 percent of the financing available for the ventures it selects for 
credit. In addition, these loans are usually only for medium and longer term fiscal 
capital formation. As a result borrowers have to turn to commercial banks for 
working capital. 
Total foreign assets of the Saudi commercial banks amounted to almost 13 
million riyals in 1979. Most.of these are in the form of deposits with other banks in 
the principal world financial centers, particularly London. Saudi Arabia's two in-
digenous banks have only recently extended their operations outside the country. 
Their operations are largely confined to the wholesale interbank market rather than 
retail banking. The foreign assets are largel~ in the form of liquid placements. Most 




Foreign assets of this type do not qualify as reserves with SAMA. Yet, there is no 
evidence that banks have had much trouble in complying with SAMA's required 
reserve ratio. These domestic liquid assets were almost as great as loans outstanding 
in 1975 and 1979. This pattern reflects the commercial bank's tendency to maintain 
large cash holdings and deposits with SAMA in excess of their reserve requirements. 
The major component of bank liabilities is current account deposits (on which no 
interest is paid). The sheer magnitude of these deposits and their growth over the 
last decade indicate that they are well in excess of what depositors require for tran-
sactions or even precautionary purposes. Clearly, many customers are using current 
accounts for their savings. In doing so they are apparently willing to accept the op-
portunity costs involved (due to high interest rates abroad and domestic inflation 
domestically). 
Saudiization 
In addition to the reasons given above for the slow expansion of banking in the 
kingdom, foreign banks were somewhat reluctant until quite recently to expand 
because of the government's Saudiization policy4. 
Under this plan, majority ownership has been transferred to Saudi nationals with 
the usual equity pattern being 40 perecent to the foreign bank, 15 to 20 percent to 
the Saudi sponsors, and 35 to 40 percent to the Saudi public. 
For several years foreign banks were prohibited from either opening new bran-
ches or increasing their capital. Branching restrictions are not in effect for Saudiized 
banks. Through enabling foreign banks to increase their capital and branches, 
Saudiization has enabled the foreign banks to begin competing with the two original 
Saudi banks, National Commercial Bank and the Riyadh Bank5• 
As it stands now (1980), the two Saudi banks still dominate the financial system. 
Combined they account for approximately 70 percent of the country's commercial 
bank assets, 80 percent of its deposits, and approximately 90 perceµt .of all com-
mercial demand accounts6• 
The dominant position of the two Saudi banks may diminish as the Saudiized 
banks pursue an aggressive policy of opening new branches and generating loans. 
Due to the relatively long time needed to build branch offices and train new staffs, it 




The basis for Islamic banking and the prohibition of interest is the belief of the 
Moslem that capital itself should not generate a 'profit without any human effort 
being exerted. Financial gains, either through interest bearing deposit accounts or 
interest charging commercial loans, are referred to as "riba" by Islamic banks and 
are strictly forbidden by the Qu'ran. Islamic law, however, does not imply that 
banks must receive negative or extremely low rates of return on equity. Under 
the "Mudaraba" system (otherwise known as profit sharing), it is possible for 
banks to do extremely well financially. 7 
Islamic codes do however permit banks to lend capital to entrepreneurs with the 
understanding that the bank will receive a certain fixed percentage of the profits 
generated by the loan. Banks stand to make a large profit through this practice, or 
conversely they share the loses if the new venture proves a financial failure. The 
Mudaraba system, therefore, assumes that a social balance is struck between the 
value of capital and the value of human endeavor, a balance that in no way reduces 
the overall level of investment that would likely take place under alternative western 
type banking practices. 
Many of the Ribah-free banks (RFBs) operating in Saudi Arabia provide a full 
range· of norma(commercial banking services. Credit provision and trade financing 
are undertaken on a profit sharing basis, while transfers, foreign exchange, check-
ing accounts, and other non-credit services are provided on a commission or fee 
basis. Fees for services are permitted by Islamic codes if they are payment for ser-
vices that involve a real exertion or effort on the part of the bank8. In short, there is 
no inherent reason why Islamic restrictions should limit bank activity or profitabili-
ty. 
Official data collected by SAMA does in fact confirm that the kingdom's com-
mercial banks are quite lucrative (as evidenced by three key ratios): (1) return on 
assets (ROA); (2) return on equity (ROE), and (3) leverage--the ratio of total assets 
to the equity of the bank's shareholders or partners. The most important indicator 
of bank profitability is return on assets. 
According to the most recent financial statements of the banks, the ROA of the 
two Saudi banks averages 2.6 percent. This is approximately 70 percent higher than 
the average 1.5 percent generated by the Saudiized banks. When the leverage factors 
of the banks are incorporated and the ROA is calculated, the difference between the 
two classes of banks is even more dramatic. NCB has the highest ROA at 47 percent. 
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Three of the four Saudiized banks on the other hand average about 20 percent9• 
Clearly, the Saudi banks operating wit.h their massive deposit bases and low costs 
of funds are able to produce profitability ratios far in excess of the Saudiized banks .. 
Although the relative size of the Saudi banks alone accounts for some of the dif-
ference in figures, the fact that they are the sole bankers in many locations in the 
kingdom (the Saudi banks have approximately 70 percent of all branches in the 
kingdom) must also contribute to their relative success. 
Finally and probably most importantly, the Saudi banks seem to have an advan-
tage in obtaining funds. While the Saudi banks do not specify the .cost of funds (the 
amount banks must spend to maintain their deposits), a reasonable proxy for the 
cost of funds (COF) for comparative purposes can be derived by dividing total ser-
vice charges (which include interest paid on savings accounts) by total funds. The 
calculation of COF indicates that the funds of the Saudi banks cost approximately 
half what funds cost the Saudiized banks. Individual comparisons are even more 
dramatic. While Riyadh Bank's funds cost approximately 0.7 percent, those of 
Bank al Saudi al Hollandi cost 2.2 percent10• This is a difference of over 200 per-
cent. By comparison the cost of funds for most U.S. banks during 1979 was in the 
neighb<2_rhood of 10 percent. 
The relatively low cost of funds must in part account, therefore, for the high pro-
fitability of Saudi banks. In spite of their low cost of funds, the Saudi banks are not 
all that aggressive in making loans. Loans and advances as a pe;centage of total 
deposits is much lower than for Saudiized banks. NCB, for example, loans only 36 
percent of its deposits, while the Saudi French Bank and the Saudi British Bank ad-
vance 83 to 84 percent of their deposits, respectively11 . 
Apparently, these ratios reflect a major difference in philosophy between the 
Saudi and Saudiized banks. While the Saudi banks are content to loan a relatively 
small percentage of their deposits, the Saudiized banks are aggressively granting 
loans to gain an increased market share. The disparity between loan deposit ratios 
may narrow as the Saudiized banks increase their deposit base through their planned 
branch expansion. 
Clearly, this deposit pattern benefits the banks and is a major reason for their 
high profitability. The value of time and saving deposits in which a fixed commis-
sion is paid in lieu of interest to the depositor (in accordance with Saudi law) re-
mains relatively modest. There seems little desire on the part of customers to switch 
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from demand to time deposits. The banks for their part seem reluctant to promote 
alternative methods of saving. 
Reluctance of the banks in promoting savings makes a certain amount of sense 
given the greater profitability on current account deposits. However, expansion in 
savings deposits might not necessarily be at the expense of their current accounts. 
Large volumes of Saudi funds are held overseas. Some of these would likely flow 
into saving if the terms were improved. Clearly, the banks are aware of this. A ma-
jor explanation of their lack of enthusiasm for savings promotion must be concern 
over antagonizing the more conservative sections of the community. Vigorous 
promotion by offering high premiums for savings may be viewed as an indirect form 
of interest. Sanctions might follow even though religious principle would not be 
undermined (so long as the higher charges are not passed on the borrowers). The 
banks' long run strategy should be one of education. i.e., since Muslim concern is 
with any hardships that might be inflicted on the latter, the banks should stress the 
fact that potential gains might be made by depositors as long as the gains are not a! 
anyone else's expense. 
To conclude with the problems listed above, the main trouble for commercial 
banks in the post-oil boom has not been one of attracting funds but finding good 
borrowers. Tot~ assets and liabilities from the commercial banks in 1974-75, for 
example, went up by 55 percent and the money supply increased by 40 percent. With 
the government responsible for about 80 percent of domestic spending, the banks 
have not so far played a big part in medium or longer financing and loans for con-
struction. But as the pace of economic developemt increases, there are signs that 
some of the liquidity is being mopped up. Deposits in commercial banks rose by 55 
percent in 1974-75, while loans and advances to the private sector soared by 90 per-
cent. 
Specialized Banks 
Specialized banks in Saudi Arabia serve a two-fold function. First, they are 
primarily a conduit for fiscal policy and are, therefore, essentially government 
agencies. Secondly, they are complementary to the commercial banks in that they 
provide long term financing. Short term financing, the essence of banking, is left to 
the commercial banks. 
The function of the government funded cre<iit institutions is to provide long term 
financing to certain sectors of the economy given a high priority by the government. 
Many projects funded by these institutions are not economically justified and, 
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therefore, would not have been undertaken without that in 1987 /79 alone, these in-
stitutions disbursed approximately SR 17 billion or just slightly less than the SR 20 
billion total loans outstanding of all commercial banks in the kingdom. 
Islamic Banks 
Granted that private initiative will provide the dynamic element in an Islamic 
growth model, the central question arises: what specific policies should the 
government adopt to encourage investment? Furthermore, given the value of in-
vestment required to produce preassigned levels of output, the next fundamental 
question is how should the savings be generated to sustain such investment? 
The process of savings formation can essentially take two forms: (1) the govern-
ment may directly generate the requisite funds (through oil revenues as in Saudi 
Arabia's case) and by encouraging private savings and making these funds available 
to investors through the capital market, or (2) alternatively the government may 
encourage corporate savings. In the latter case savings are generated within the 
private sector by a combination of fiscal, price and wage policies, all tending to in-
crease undistributed corporate profits (which are then assumed to be reinvested). In 
this method the investors are also the savers. Because the first of these two policies 
relies og interest rates, these may be incompatible with the Islamic view of basic 
economic processes. 
The dilemma for Saudi policy makers arises from the fact that the first policy, 
although relying on the interest rate to mobilize private savings, results in a more 
equal distribution of income than the second. The second policy deliberately fosters 
extreme inequalities of income and wealth, and thus the dilemma. 
An innovative away of reconciling this problem has been through the creation of 
a new type of bank-the Islamic bank run on the principles of Shari'a law. 
The new Islamic Development Bank, headquartered in Jeddah and capitalized in 
great part with Saudi money, is an example of this innovation in banking. Its direc-
tor indicated on occasion that only 20 percent of its future business will be in interest 
free loans. The remainder is likely to be in the form of free or limited partnerships. 
If a lender becomes a partner, he or it can legitimately under Shari'a law accept part 
of the profits of the enterprise. Clearly, this procedure circumvents the interest 
restriction. 
Among the other activities of the Islamic Development Bank are: (1) participating 
in capital projects; (2) extending loans to institutions and productive projects in 
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member countries; (3) extending financial assistance in various forms for economic 
growth and social progress; (4) helping in international trade between member 
countries and in the production of commodities, and (5) extending technical 
assistance, particularly in training personnel, in economic development, research, 
banking and other economic activities in accordance with the Shari'a12• 
Broadly speaking, Islamic banks maintain three types of accounts: (1) nonprofit 
accounts with a very small minimum deposit from which withdrawal can be made at 
any time; (2) profit sharing deposit accounts with a modest minimum balance from 
which withdrawal can be made annually (or at shorter intervals), and (3) social ser-
vices funds, consisting of gifts from which payments are made in emergencies such 
as accidents involving participants. The profit made by these is said to be enormous 
for both profit sharing depositors and stockholders. 
Traditionalists who aspire to restore Islam to its original purity and escape from 
alien influences have cited Islamic banks as proof of the suitability and adaptability 
of the Islamic doctrine to the needs of modern times. The sponsors of these banks 
argue that the Islamic banks are not much different from the familiar western 
banks. The only difference is that they are not based on fixed rates of interest on 
loans or on despoits, which from their point of view are usurious under the Shari'a 
law. The regulai:, banks they argue not only deal in money but also invest in 
agricultural, industrial, commercial and human projects. Therefore, Islamic banks 
can deal and invest in such projects but wit~out the use of usurious interest rates 13• 
Efficiency of Monetary Policy 
Throughout the postwar period there has been a growing awareness of the im-
portance of monetary policy in the progress of economic growth stimulated by 
research and debates concerning the role and effectiveness of money and monetary 
policy. While the issues have been discussed at length, both at the university and 
government levels, the role that monetary policy can play remains a subject of 
dispute among academicians and policy markers alike14• 
Although the issues concerning the influence of monetary aggregates on produc-
tion, employment, and economic growth has not been settled to everyone's 
satisfaction, all parties at least agree that the monetary and real sectors of an 
economy are invariably interconnected. In natiQns the economic activities of which 




revenues accrue to the government, the need to disburse the huge revenues renders 
the entire economy dependent on government budgetary policies. As a result, both 
monetary, and fiscal policies determine t~e level of production, consumption, and 
investment in such economies. As is the case in most surplus funds countries, the 
monetary and fiscal policies of Saudi Arabia are so closely related that they can be 
taken as one and the same thing, for the flow of money into the economic system 
depends on the extent to which the Saudi Arabian government spends from its oil 
revenues. 
With regard to countries like Saudi Arabia whose money and capital markets are 
extremely limited and in the process of evolution, the debate is not so much con-
cerned with the intricacies of the transmission process but tends to be more policy 
oriented. Here primary concern is more with the manner in which monetary policy 
can be used to achieve economic objectives; in this connection there is also 
disagreement as to the extent which these policies can be effective, given the prevail-
ing economic conditions. In general, there has been a tendency to attribute a low 
importance to monetary policy in Saudi Arabia because the public sector so 
dominates economic activity. Largely because of infaltion, there has been renewed 
interest in developing a more active role for monetary policy in the kingdom. 
Obviqusly, given the institutional setting of SAMA, the question immediately 
arises as to whether the agency has enough tools at its disposal to perform the nor-
mal tasks involved in an activist monetary policy. For example, in the usual situa-
tion, if a central bank determines that it should tighten or raise interest rates and 
thereby slow the economic growth of the country, it has three major actions 
available. First, it can raise reserve requirements. Second, it can raise the interest 
rate for borrowing from the discount window. Third, it can conduct open market 
operations by selling (and purchasing) government securities, and thereby decrease 
(and increase) the cash in the system as the securities are paid for (sold) and money 
transferred to (from) the government. 
As noted, SAMA has evolved to the point where it performs many of the tradi-
tional central bank functions, such as serving as the governemt's fiscal agent, 
managing the country·•s foreign exchange reserves and supervising the commercial 
banks. Nominal money is created primarily by government spending (government 
consumption is paid for in cash) and to a lesser extent through the creation of excess 
commercial bank reserves (which may lead to additional lending) . 
• Some imported restriction on SAMA remain, however. The agency may not ex-
tend credit to the government or to private entities (including banks), and because it 
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may not contravene Islamic laws, it may not use the discount rate as an instrument 
of monetary policy. 
These restrictions obviously place limitations, on SAMA's ability to implement 
monetary policy. They also cast some doubt as to the capability of the country 
under certain circumstances in being able to achieve its major economic objectives. 
The seriousness one attaches to this problem depends in large part on the empirical 
relationships in the kingdom between government spending, the money supply and 
macroeconomic aggregates--an area in which there is considerable controversy. 
Because SAMA is not a lender of last resort in the traditional sense (it will not 
discount commercial paper), reserve requirements are the only major tool at its 
disposal. Clearly, this has restricted the agency's ability to stabilize the economy. It 
is not clear, however, that given the fact that it can inject funds into the system by 
placing government funds in its deposits at commercial banks it is unable to pursue 
some sort of activist policy. SAMA can also regulate the money supply through 
modifying capital flows in and out of the kingdom. 
In this regard Saudi monetary policy, because of the unregulated domestic in-
terest rate, has much more flexibility than that of most other Gulf states. In par-
ticular Kuwait ~~d the UAE governments have tended to regulate domestic interest 
rates quite arbitrarily at very low levels. With international rates much higher, ar-
bitrage has resulted in a large exodus of capital from these countries and continues 
to be a major problem. Saudi Arabians' strong feelings against interest rates seem to 
moderate the outflow from the kingdom. In addition, the government by regulating 
its expenditures has controlled the growth of the money supply more tightly than the 
other Gulf centers. The result has been that SAMA has been able to control capital 
outflows somewhat, and in fact, uses them as a policy tool. For example, one way 
SAMA reduces the domestic money supply is to simply let capital outflows occur 
when inflationary pressures are building up. With these flows, the money supply can 
be contracted simply by not putting any more money into the system and relying on 
the outflow to continue. 
Despite the controlled capital flow innovation, SAMA has relied by far on changes 
in reserve requirements as its major monetary tool. Changes in reserve requirements 
influences the currency issue indirectly; i.e., an increase in reserve requirements 
causes commercial banks to increase their demand for reserves and thus sterilizes the 
effects of any increase in government spencijng. In this situation a reduction in 
government deposits is matched by an increase in bank deposits at SAMA leaving 






While reserve requirement changes are effective, there may be limits on its use. By 
the late 1970s, for example, de facto reserve requirements were between 40 and 50 
percent. At these levels any significant increase might weaken the banking system 
and prevent it from playing a significant role in the economy. There are, however, 
several possible innovations in SAMA's policy that are consistent with Islamic law 
and at the same time capable of stimulating growth without inflation. For ex-
ample15: 
1. set a target growth of currency equal to the real growth of the economy; 
2. control its spending so that it conforms with the targets established for currency 
growth; 
3. encourage private purchases of foreign assets in amounts which are consistent 
with the economy's domestic financial needs through the development of a new riyal 
denominated certificate. 
These certificates could be developed and managed along the following lines: 
1. SAMA establishing a special account to which it could transfer a certain share of 
its foreign assets; 
2. SAMA being prepared to sell the riyal denominated certificates in an amount 
equal to the local curreny value of the foreign assets in the special account. If these 
certificates .were purchased by the government, they would be paid for by a reduc-
tion in government deposits at SAMA with no initial effect on reserve money or 
currency. If the certificates were purchased by the public, they would be paid for by 
both currency and checks which, via' a reduction in bank reserves, would reduce the 
amount of reserve money and currency in the hands of the public . 
3. These certificates would not pay interest directly, but would simply pass through 
the income received by SAMA on the foreign assets in its special account. In addi-
tion, because the certificates are denominated in local currency, there would be no 
foreign exchange risk to the purchaser. These characterisitics would make the pass 
through certificates desirable to hold by the public. 
4. Government purchases of the certificates would not immediately affect the level 
of reserve money, because the reduction in government deposits at SAMA would be 
matched by an equal and opposite increase in the number of cer'tificates which 
SAMA would maintain for the government. However, in the event that the 
government runs a budget deficit at some future time, the certificates would provide 
a method of financing other than through SAMA. The government could sell the 
certificates to the public in an amount equal to its deficit. This would be non-
• inflationary because the funds which the government would put into the economy 
would be matched by funds withdrawn via public purchase of certificates from the 
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government. This procedure can be contrasted with the current situation where any 
government budget deficit would be financed, in effect, by a money creation process 
which would represent a net increase in public liquidity in the form of reserve 
money. Thus the current procedure potentially could be far more inflationary than 
the certificate plan. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In spite of its growth, the banking system remains less sophisticated than the 
market it serves. There is little computerization, no secondary market for money 
market instruments, and a still somewhat passive monetary authority. This en-
vironment has led to wide and dangerous swings in the system's liquidity. There are 
signs, however, that the industry is addressing these issues. In particular, SAMA, 
while not yet assuming all of the traditional functions of a central bank, is never-
theless beginning to play a more role in managing the kingdom's monetary affairs. 
In addition, it seems clear that Islamic practices do not place any particular insur-
mountable constraints on the financial system. 
Given Saudi Arabia's high growth rates, relatively tranquil social and political 
atmosphere.__one must come to the conclusion that at a minimum there is nothing 
apparently adverse associated with the Islamic growth model. At best it might be 
possible to attribute considerable amounts of the kingdom's economic success to the 
application of this model. Other niiddle eastern countries should be cautious, 
however, before seriously considering adopting some of the kingdom's Islamic bas-
ed economic policies. 
Moslem scholars argue that the Islamic economic system is uniquely designed to 
minimize if not eliminate built-in contradictions and inequalities such as those 
characterisitic of both capitalist and communist economic systems. In this regard 
the internal social and political stability of the kingdom appears to stem from the 
fact that through both the foresight of its leaders and their ability to combat ine-
quality through programs made possible by oil revenues, they have already made 
genuine accommodations between the country's societal institution whereby people 
live and function with cultural and religious values that give life meaning and worth. 
Islamic scriptures are not explicit as far as the economic foundations of Islamic 
scriptures are concerned. A reading of these sources provides some principles for 
• behavior and a few constraints on human action. They should rather act as a code of 





system and its Islamic growth model are unique to that country's history and in-
stitutions. Adaptation of the system by other countries might lead to an internally 
inconsistent conglomeration of economic policies. Any attempts to artificially 
telescope the evolutionary process involved in framing rules of the game in a real life 
Islamic society is fraught with great dangers. A sensible government will have to 
exercise utmost caution in forming economic policies for the simple reason that they 
undoubtedly do not have as many degrees of freedom as the Saudis. 
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